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NEA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: 
IDENTITY, MARKETS, AND PERSISTENT 
RACIAL INEQUALITY 
Patrick L. Mason 
Yet Do I Marvel 
By Countee Cullen 
I doubt not God is good, well-meaning, 
kind, 
And did He stoop to quibble could tell why 
The little buried mole continues blind, 
Why flesh that mirrors 
Him must some day die, 
Make plain the reason tortured 
Tantalus Is baited by the fickle fruit, 
declare 
If merely brute caprice dooms Sisyphus 
To struggle up a never-ending stair. 
Inscrutable His ways are, and immune 
To catechism by a mind too strewn 
With petty cares to slightly understand 
What awful brain compels His awful hand. 
Yet do I marvel at this curious thing: 
To make a poet black, and bid him sing. t
Which leads me to add one Remark: That the Number of purely white Peo- 
ple in the World is proportionably very small. All Africa is black or tawny. 
Asia chiefly tawny. America (exclusive of the new Comers) wholly so. And 
in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes, are gener- 
ally of what we call a swarthy Complexion; as are the Germans also, the 
Saxons only excepted, who with the English, make the principal Body of 
White People on the Face of the Earth. I could wish their Numbers were 
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increased. And while we are, as I may call it, Scouring our Planet, by clear- 
ing America of Woods, and so making this Side of our Globe reflect a brighter 
Light to the Eyes of Inhabitants inMars or Venus, why should we in the Sight 
of Superior Beings, darken its People? why increase the Sons of Africa, by 
Planting them in America, where we have so fair an Opportunity, by exclud- 
ing all Blacks and Tawneys, of increasing the lovely White and Red? But per- 
haps I am partial to the Compexion of my Country, for such Kind of Partial- 
ity is natural to Mankind. 
Benjamin Franklin, 1751 
Although racial categories are biologically arbitrary, they are deliberate 
social constructions. Racial ines are drawn to accomplish socioeconomic divi- 
sions, so we should not be surprised at the stubborn persistence of racial 
inequalities. Despite multiple slave rebellions, a virulent Civil War, several 
major constitutional mendments, a 90-year sociopolitical war against Jim 
Crow, and an ongoing movement for racial justice, American society remains 
wedded to the racial paradigm of the founding slave owners: the reproduction 
of racial identities (and racial conflict) across generations through persistent 
intergenerational inequality in the distributions of wealth and power. 
Certainly, the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements of 1945-1973 suc- 
cessfully reconstructed the American political, social, and economic landscape. 
These movements succeeded in destroying Jim Crow in the South and many 
elements of de facto and de jure racial segregation outside of the South. Com- 
bined with the earlier historical processes of migration and urbanization, deseg- 
regation succeeded in creating heretofore unknown socioeconomic opportuni- 
ties for African Americans. Nevertheless, the Civil Rights and Black Power 
movements and concomitant social changes failed to eliminate race as a major 
determinant of the life-chances of individuals within American society. Simply 
put, these movements were unable to dislodge the systemic social advantages 
associated with whiteness and the systemic reductions in opportunity associ- 
ated with being black; these movements have had only marginal effect on the 
American distributions of wealth and power. 
Given this legacy of large and persistent racial advantages and privileges 
associated with whites in American society, why would anyone in this society 
self-identify as black? To the extent hat racial identity is a social construction 
and not a biological datum, standard economic analysis would suggest that all 
individual Americans of African descent should self-identify as white. From 
the orthodox perspective, only irrational individuals will self-identify as non- 
white. Certainly, European immigrants of the late 19th and early 20th cen- 
turies-Jews, Irish, Italians, and others--fought mightily to be included into 
Mason 15 
white racial identity. They succeeded. There is also evidence of strong white- 
ness acculturation among some Latino immigrants of the late 20th century. 
Apparently, however, African Americans are permanently outside of white- 
ness and, by extension, rational economic alculation. When individual Amer- 
icans were given the option to self-select one or more racial identities on the 
2000 decennial federal census, nearly 35 million persons choose black alone 
(Grieco and Cassidy, 2001). I Only 1.8 million persons of African descent (4.67 
percent of all blacks) self-identified as black and at least one additional racial 
category. About half of blacks who selected multiple racial group member- 
ship selected white as a second, third, or other additional racial category. 
After examining the orthodox theory of racial identity and contrasting it
with the stylized facts of black identity, this paper develops a straightforward 
argument. Namely, there are strong economic incentives for the transformation 
of distinctive phenotypic characteristics and unique cultural attributes into eco- 
nomic property and competing racial identities. Furthermore, galitarian inter- 
and intraracial distributions of wealth and power must be major elements in any 
earnest attempt to purge American society of racism and racial conflict. In 
short, the formation of racial identities and the accompanying incentives for 
racial conflict are casually related to and constituent elements of the repro- 
duction of the large inequities in material resources that are everywhere present 
in American society. 
Our model has three elements. One, identity is an economic good. Identity 
provides individuals both with a means of entering into groups (and therefore 
represents a source of personal satisfaction) and a means of attaining status 
within groups (and therefore is connected to wealth accumulation). Many 
social groups are open to each person: family, neighborhood, social clubs, edu- 
cational affiliation, religious institutional membership, rofessional organiza- 
tion, etc. Membership in each of these groups requires accepting the identity of 
the group, just as persons are frequently excluded in order to preserve the par- 
ticular identity of the group. Race, however, is an encompassing identity that 
conditions entry into most other social groups and identities. 
Two, because wealth is the most consistent symbol of status attainment in
social groups, the construction of racial identity has an impact on income, inde- 
pendently of any effect that it may have on skill accumulation. Some racial 
identities will raise a group's rate of return to skill above the social mean; others 
will push the group's rate of return below the social average, while some other 
identities may have a direct effect on personal satisfaction without having an 
income effect. 
Three, the construction of racial identity norms is an evolutionary process 
reflecting the collective interactions of all persons in society. Persons cooper- 
ate and compete over a range of socioeconomic activities, for example, 
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employment, education, housing, credit, mating opportunities, religious, polit- 
ical and other institutional leadership ositions, and so forth. Each person uti- 
lizes his or her own individual productive abilities in these social interactions 
and each person competes or cooperates by employing an identity strategy 
that allows him/her greater or lesser access to some portion of group resources 
that he or she may draw upon to enhance productive potential. In particular, 
people engage in social interactions with resources that are provided to (or 
withheld from) them by their families, other nurturing roups, and those who 
support aparticular identity action. People construct racial identities by adher- 
ing to specific identity strategies. Each person selects an identity strategy that 
increases his or her well-being, given the set of identity strategies selected by 
all other persons. Strategies that are wealth-increasing are imitated by others 
whose previous trategies may have been wealth-decreasing. Thereby, aracial 
norm is established. 
ORTHODOX SOCIAL SCIENCE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
OF "THE BLACK DEFICIENCY SCHOOL" 
The black deficiency perspective holds that racial inequality in American 
society is caused by deficiencies among African Americans. There are neo- 
eugenics and behavioralist versions of this perspective. The neo-eugenics 
approach (Murray and Herrnstein, 1994) argues that !) hereditary differences 
in individual intellectual bility are the source of nearly all socioeconomic 
inequality, 2) racial boundaries are fixed by nature and (on average) blacks have 
lower intellectual bility than whites, and, hence, 3) racial inequality persists 
across generations because blacks are genetically inferior to whites. 
Behavioralist cholars often seek to separate themselves from the neo- 
eugenics arguments of Murray and Herrnstein. They offer instead a behav- 
ioralist model of racial identity. Nevertheless, both empirical and theoretical 
economists of this second group have a continuously negative assessment of
black families, black communities, black culture, black intelligence, and black 
life choices. From this perspective, whiteness carries no particular social or 
economic advantage--rather, blackness is a behavioral disadvantage since 
black identity reduces an individual's life-chances. Whiteness confers no spe- 
cial significance in the market because the market is concerned only with indi- 
vidual productive ability and not group affiliation. Blackness reduces life- 
chances because a disproportionately large percentage of persons who are 
identified as black have deficiencies that limit their acquisition of productive abil- 
ities. So, the behavioralist argument is that if blacks only behaved like whites 
racial inequality would disappear and it would do so without exogenous alter- 
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ations in the interracial distributions of wealth and power. Notably, neither the 
behavioralist nor the neo-eugenicist proponents of black deficiency are con- 
cerned with the manner in which white monopolies of wealth and power con- 
tribute to the continuous reproduction of racial inequality and racial conflict. 
Consider that according to the most widely cited theory of racial discrimi- 
nation, racial discrimination may persist only in those areas of society sheltered 
from the competitive forces of the market (Becket, 1957). Accordingly, Neal 
and Johnson (1996) argued that contemporary racial income inequality is not 
caused by racial discrimination i the market; rather, contemporary acial 
income inequality is completely caused by inferior black skills accumulated 
prior to labor market entry. In particular, Neal and Johnson believe that it is 
solely lower quality education among African Americans that is responsible for 
lower income among African Americans. Murray and Herrnstein (1994) bring 
closure to the logic of this argument by announcing that inferior black educa- 
tion and lower black life-chances inAmerican society are caused by the lower 
intelligence quotient of African Americans. However, Neal and Johnson prof- 
fer that it is inferior families and neighborhoods that poorly equip African 
Americans for the competitive r quirements of the labor market. 
An earlier generation ofscholars also argued that persistent racial inequality 
occurs because of "dysfunctional" behavior of low-income blacks (Loury, 1984) 
and "pathological" black families (Moynihan, 1965). This perspective suggests 
that educational quality is relatively lower among African Americans than whites 
because of relatively lower social capital (market functional values) among 
African Americans (Loury, 1989). For Loury, discrimination persists in (non- 
market) relations of contact, but not (market) relations of contract. Blacks have 
lower social capital than whites because racial discrimination i relations of 
contact means that blacks do not have access to superior white social capital, that 
is white values and behavior, through marriage, social group membership, etc. 
Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2003) present one of the more recent claims 
that unequal access to educational resources i not the source of inferior black 
education; deficiencies within African American families are the problem. 
According to Mead (1992:114), the negative assessment ofAfrican Ameri- 
can men by orthodox social science scholars is "well earned, and it is difficult 
to believe that many competent Black workers are being denied opportunity." 
Mead's racial chauvinism is explicit, "[T]he worldview of Blacks make them 
uniquely prone to attitudes contrary to work, and thus vulnerable to poverty and 
dependence" (Mead, 1992:148-151, quoted in Peterson, 1998:759). 
Building on his behavioralist model of identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), 
Akerlof (2002) equates black racial identity with the prescriptive behavioral 
requirements of "oppositional culture," while white racial identity is the same 
as the prescriptive r quirements of the "dominant culture." Akerlof writes that 
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dispossessed races and classes face a Hobbesian choice. One possibility 
is to choose an identity that adapts to the dominant culture. But such an 
identity is adopted with the knowledge that full acceptance by members 
of the dominant culture is unlikely. Such a choice is also likely to be psy- 
chologically costly to oneself since it involves being someone "differ- 
ent"; family and friends, who are also outside the dominant culture are 
likely also to have negative attitudes toward a maverick who has adopted 
it. Thus, individuals are likely to feel that they can never fully "pass." 
A second possibility is to adopt he historically determined alterna- 
tive identity, which, for many minorities, is an oppositional culture. 
Curiously, neither Akerlof nor other black deficiency school scholars explores 
the contribution of white racial identity formation to the status of blacks as a 
"dispossessed" group. Moreover, if white identity is merely prescriptive behav- 
ior that increases market productivity why is it that blacks who adopt such 
behavior are not allowed to "pass?" 
According to Akerlof, the prescriptions of the dominant culture endorse 
"self-fulfillment"; hence, the prescriptions of oppositional cultural are self- 
destructive. So, Akerlof strongly re-asserts he central claim of the behavioral- 
ist framework of the black deficiency school, African American social and eco- 
nomic disadvantage is due to "self-destructive" b havior. According to Akerlof, 
inferior African American education--and byextension, reduced intergenera- 
tional mobility, is caused by black identity, which is purely an "oppositional 
identity" that is opposed to educational chievement because ducational 
achievement is prescriptive behavior associated with white identity. 
The prescriptions for oppositional identity are commonly defined in 
terms of "what he dominant culture is not." Since the prescriptions ofthe 
dominant culture ndorse "self-fulfillment," hose of the oppositional cul- 
ture are self-destructive. The identity of the oppositional culture may be 
easier on the ego, but it is also likely to be economically and physically 
debilitating (Akerlof, 2002:427). 
Although Akerlof and Kranton (2002) present evidence from the High School 
and Beyond national survey that African Americans---especially African Amer- 
ican women--have better attitudes toward school than whites, they assert hat 
African Americans only "appear to have better attitudes toward school than 
whites." Instead, they argue that standards of ideal behavior differ by race and 
further insinuate that African American educational ideals are lower than white 
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ideals; hence, from their perspective, survey data that show more positive du- 
cational attitudes among African Americans cannot be taken at face value. 
Taken seriously, the black deficiency school's behavioralist framework sug- 
gests that black-white ducational, social, and economic equality can be 
achieved only if African Americans are willing to abandon "black culture." As 
such, the deficiency perspective yields a testable hypothesis: 1) "successful" 
African Americans hould be substantially ess likely to self-identity with black 
culture than African Americans of more moderate socioeconomic status. 2
SOME STYLIZED FACTS OF BLACK RACIAL IDENTITY 
It is worth repeating that more than 95 percent of all African Americans 
self-identify as black alone, notwithstanding the 2000 decennial census option 
for each respondent toselect any racial category or any combination of racial 
categories consistent with the respondent's racial-cultural preferences. Pre- 
sumably, respondents selected the racial-cultural identity that yielded the 
highest level of satisfaction. Despite the black deficiency school's negative 
assessment of black families and black culture, African Americans have not 
demonstrated a esire to acculturate into white identity. Quite the opposite, 
the census and other data show conclusively that African Americans of all 
economic ircumstances have demonstrated an extraordinarily strong revealed 
preference for black identity. For example, African Americans are the most seg- 
regated group in America and the extent of this segregation i creases slightly 
with income (Massey and Denton, 1993; U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). Affluent 
African Americans living outside the South are more segregated than affluent 
African American Southerners. Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi (2002) find that "more 
than one-half of the level of housing segregation can be attributed to blacks' 
preferences tolive among blacks and whites' preferences tolive among whites." 
(They do not dismiss the importance of racial discrimination against African 
Americans in the housing market or the importance of racial differences in 
income as an important factor for explaining racial segregation i  housing)) 
Unlike educational nd employment institutions, which are subject o laws 
forbidding discrimination (regardless of the actual effectiveness of legal sanc- 
tions), there are no laws or social sanctions designed to desegregate private 
social interactions. Marriage and religious worship are particularly segregated, 
even as they are uniquely important institutions for shaping racial norms. In 
1960, five years before the end of Jim Crow, 0.14 percent of all white marriages 
were to an African American (Table 1). By 1992, just 0.52 percent of all white 
marriages were to an African American. By comparison, black-white marriages 
were 1.65 percent of all African American marriages in 1960 and 6.54 percent 
















m m ~  
cq ~ a~ - -  ZZ  Z 
m ~ c~r - -m 
Mason 21  
7~< ~ . 
ca o 
<<<<<<~.  • ~, ~ ~-~ 
ZZZZ zzeq  ~ "~@ 
c'!.t":.m.~'m.r X ~ ~ ~ "~ 
oe oo ~ ,.,q ~::~ .~- o-, "-' g :  ~.~ 
~. ,z l - ' ,~  r..- r oo o-, X 
<<<<<<~ ,--, ~ ,~="  
d ...= 
~.a'"~ e..l: = e- r r 
,.= .~ ~ ~ "~ 
< < < < < < ~  a', ~ ..= -,...- t~ 
g 
' ,~ mm c - , leq  ~ m t'--- o ~ . .c :  - ~ 
o o z ' - = O  
9 - ~: , -  ,...~ ~..~ 
o ~, ~ ~.= 
N~< e g 
< ~ o ~ -~  ~ 
7o 
0 







22 The Review of Black Political Economy/Summer 2004 
of all African Americans in 1992 (U.S. Census, 1998). According to the 2000 
decennial census, 0.73 percent of all white marriages are with blacks and 8.27 
percent of all African American marriages are with whites (Fields and Casper, 
2001). These numbers are surprisingly low given the extraordinary level of 
interracial contact at schools, colleges, and places of employment. 
Well over 90 percent of African Americans are at least nominally Christian. 4 
Nearly all black Christians attend predominantly black religious institutions. 
Lincoln and Mamiya (1990) write that the seven historically black congrega- 
tions (various groups of Baptists, Methodists, and Pentecostals) 
account for more than 80 percent of black religious affiliation in the 
United States . . . . .  Moreover, the remaining 15 to 20 percent of black 
Christians are scattered among numerous small black sects, the Roman 
Catholic Church, and the mainline Protestant denominations. The over- 
whelming majority of the latter are in predominantly black congrega- 
tions, despite denomination affiliation with white communions (p. xii). 
White membership n predominantly black denominations is so rare that one 
enterprising bishop in Louisiana sought o increase white membership n his 
church by paying whites to attend--S5 for attending a Sunday morning service 
and $10 for attending a Thursday evening service (Lodwick, 2003)! Given 
that many whites in the church's neighborhood worked in minimum wage jobs, 
the bishop had astutely chosen a service payment greater than the opportunity 
cost of time for many whites in the area; yet, he reported that his church is more 
than 99 percent black. 
The attachment of African Americans to a black identity can be noted also in 
the rise of identifiably black names ince 1965. During the years of the Black 
Power Movement many African Americans, most notably those affiliated with 
the Nation of Islam, began to change their names from traditional names of 
European origin to names that are African, African-sounding but completely 
made-up, or European origin but with an unusual spelling. Today, Kenya, 
Kenyetta, Ebony, Jamal, Lakisha, Nia, Darnell, Kikora, Nailah, Naima, Laque- 
sha, Laquanda, Myesha, etc. are now recognizably black names. Identifiably 
black names are increasing in popularity among African Americans of all 
income levels despite the fact that employers discriminate against job appli- 
cants with such names and despite the fact that white teachers discriminate 
against students with identifiably black names (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003; Figlio, 2003). 
The racial-cultural identity of blacks may indeed be different from the 
racial-cultural identity of whites. However, a different racial-cultural identity 
does not imply an "oppositional" cultural identity. To say that African Ameri- 
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cans have a behaviorally "oppositional culture" trivializes the African origins 
of blacks and the history of white supremacy in America and, in so doing, 
asserts biased subjective normative priors which falsely assume that all fac- 
tors that define white culture are desirable, orthogonal to racial conflict, and 
universal; hence, by construction, the behavioralist framework is ill equipped 
to consider the possibility that African Americans can have both a distinct 
racial identity and an identity that is also achievement oriented, success ori- 
ented, future oriented, and that embraces strong family values. Additionally, the 
behavioralist framework isunable to consider the possibility that a black racial- 
cultural identity provides African Americans with protection against the social 
injustices associated with the formation of whiteness. 
For example, strong roup identification for blacks appears to provide some 
insulation/protection against adverse health effects of the stress associated with 
racism and discrimination (Williams, Spencer, and Jackson, 1999). It also 
appears that black identity encourages educational chievement even when 
there are greatly reduced material incentives to do so. Between 1976 and 1995 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) black-white math gap declined by more 
than 21 percent, while the SAT black-white verbal gap declined by 25 percent 
(Bowen and Bok, 1998). During 1971-1999, the National Assessment ofEdu- 
cational Progress hows that the black-white racial gaps in reading, mathe- 
matics, and science declined by 40, 20, and 4 percent, respectively (U.S. 
Department ofEducation, 2000). Hence, we notice a decline in interracial test 
score gap since the mid-1970s, even though we have witnessed stagnation and 
decline in the movement toward relative black-white arnings equality since 
the mid- 1970s (Bernstein, 1995). 
A reasonable person (if not an informed scholar) might be willing to con- 
sider that the unique experiences of African Americans have fostered the 
growth of a racial-cultural identity that is capable of sustaining individual aca- 
demic and economic success and, simultaneously, is in cognitive dissonance 
with the persistent social injustices of this society. Consider the words of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., who argued that "Racism, economic exploitation, and 
militarism" are the "triple evils" of American capitalism (Washington, 
1986:250). In America, "profit motives and property rights are considered more 
important han people (Washington, 1986:629)." Social justice for the 
oppressed is a non-issue. Reverend King explained, 
A nation that will keep people in slavery for 244 years will "thingify" 
them, make them things. Therefore they will exploit hem, and poor peo- 
ple generally, economically. And a nation that will exploit economically 
will have to have foreign investments.. ,  will have to use its military 
might o protect them (Washington, 1986:251). 
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Continuing, King stated, "For years I labored with the idea of reforming the 
existing institutions of the society, a little change here, a little change there. 
Now I feel quite differently. I think you've got to have a reconstruction f the 
entire society." Furthermore, "Something is wrong with capitalism as it now 
stands in the United States. We are not interested in being integrated into this 
value s t ructure . . ,  a radical redistribution of power must take place" (Fair- 
clough, 1984:241, emphasis added). 
Using more colorful anguage, Malik Shabazz (Malcolm X) described cap- 
italism as a "bloodsucking" system. Shabazz argued that, "It's impossible for 
a white person to believe in capitalism and not believe in racism. You can't have 
capitalism without racism (Breitman, 1965:69)." He further stated that 
this is the worst racist society on this earth. There is no country on earth 
in which you can live and racism be brought out in you--whether you're 
white or black--more so than this country that poses as a democracy. This 
is a country where the social, economic, political atmosphere creates asort 
of psychological tmosphere that makes it almost impossible, if you're in 
your right mind, to walk down the street with a white person and not be 
self-conscious. It almost can't be done, and it makes you feel this racist 
tendency that pops up. But it's the society itself (Breitman, p. 214). 
Thus, both the supposed "integrationist" King and the alleged "black sepa- 
ratist" Shabazz agreed that black identity is separate from white identity. But, 
neither King nor Shabazz saw black identity as behaviorally or otherwise infe- 
rior to white identity and neither suggested that acculturation i to the dominant 
identity is something blacks should aspire to. Simultaneously, both encouraged 
African Americans to have a positive attitude toward hard work and achieve- 
ment, strong family values, amoral and ethical ifestyle, and continuous strug- 
gle to reconstruct America's political economy. 
Surely, much has changed about America and the world since the mid- to 
late 1960s heyday of King and Shabazz. Nevertheless, African American polit- 
ical economic thought and cultural identity continues to be characterized bya 
unyielding ambivalence toward American political and economic institutions 
and great skepticism regarding whites' willingness to aggressively pursue 
actions that will make America a racially just society (Kelley, 1999; Boston, 
1997). In a national survey of African American ideologies, Dawson (2001) 
shows that 37 percent of African Americans ubscribe to the basic tenets of 
black nationalism; 34 percent are comfortable with the core ideas of black 
Marxism; 40 percent of African Americans are disillusioned liberals; 19 per- 
Mason 25 
cent of African Americans accept feminist ideology; and, only 1 percent of 
African Americans accept he ideological beliefs of black conservatism. 
The stylized facts of black racial identity are not consistent with the empir- 
ical predictions and subjective normative priors of the black deficiency school. 
The behavioralist economic model of racial identity, and with it the edifice of 
the black deficiency school, confuses African Americans' pessimistic evalua- 
tion of the possibility for racial justice within American society with a negative 
assessment of black identity on economic outcomes. Orthodox economics pre- 
sents a seriously deficient understanding of the formation of racial identity 
and the distribution of well-being. 
RACIAL IDENTITY AS A SOCIAL NORM 
Let us consider an alternative perspective. For simplicity, assume our pop- 
ulation is limited to two social categories, say "Europeans" and "Africans." 
Assume that Europeans and Africans are easily distinguished from each other, 
perhaps by skin shade. These skin shade differences are biologically given, eas- 
ily observed in all cases, and permanent. Assume, also, that the average wealth 
among Europeans greatly exceeds the average wealth among Africans. In order 
to understand how skin shade is transformed into a racialized social norm we 
must consider a second and endogenous racial dimension. 5 Suppose ach per- 
son enters into social interactions either as an "individualist" or as a "racial- 
ist." Individualists do not participate in the group behavior of his or her social 
group, but rather attempt o live as if they are race-free, even though their 
exogenous race is in fact observable and has consequences if sufficiently many 
other persons are racialists. A racialist chooses to identify with his or her social 
group and thus to participate in whatever costs and benefits are conferred by 
group membership. Hence, the population divides into four mutually exclu- 
sive categories: European individualists, European racialists, African individ- 
ualists, and African racialists. Let us refer to Europeans racialists as "whites" 
and African racialists as "blacks." Thus, race is two-dimensional. One dimen- 
sion is biologically and economically irrelevant, exogenous, and captured by 
skin-shade differences (African v. European). The second dimension is endoge- 
nous, socially constructed (individualist v. racialist), and has great implications 
for the distribution of well-being. 
Assume that there are a large number of continuously repeated social inter- 
actions between persons. In each social interaction people make identity 
choices and compare the outcomes of their choices with the identity choices 
of others in society. If they see that an alternative choice will make them bet- 
ter off, they select hat choice in the next social interaction. If they see no alter- 
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native that will make them better off, they stay with their current identity in 
the next social interaction. The proportional division of the population between 
African and European is exogenous and fixed over time. Within each social 
group, the division between individualists and racialists evolves endogenously. 
Thus, the two key endogenous variables are (i) the fraction of persons elf- 
identifying as white (/x~) and (ii) the fraction of persons elf-identifying as
blacks (/xtb). Ultimately, what kind of society will observe? Will economic 
forces establish incentives to create a society characterized by individualists 
who attach no meaning to skin shade? Will economic incentives lead to the cre- 
ation of a society bifurcated by rigid norms regarding racial identity, where skin 
shade is immensely important? Will/z~ and #~ approach an extreme (zero or 
one)? Will Africans or Europeans have greater payoff success in the long run as 
social norms are established? 
Suppose we have a matching process that allows within-group social inter- 
actions (African-to-African and European-to-European) to occur with a dif- 
ferent probability than between-group meeting (African-to-European). A social 
interaction results in a payoff to each of the two participants in the meeting. 
The payoffs are interpreted asresults of economic production. Each person uti- 
lizes his or her own individual productive abilities in these social interactions 
and each person has greater or lesser access to some portion of group resources 
that he or she may draw upon to enhance productive potential. In particular, 
people engage in social interactions with resources that are provided to (or 
withheld from) them by their families, other nurturing roups, and those who 
support a particular identity action. The population frequencies ~ '  and/z~ 
evolve in response to average payoffs by category. 
Social interactions may be altruistic, antagonistic, or neutral. In altruistic 
social interactions, the productivity of the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts. Both persons bring to the relationship their own resources and skills as 
well as access to the resources and skills of their families, professional rela- 
tionships, information etworks, and other parties of interest. An egalitarian 
mutual exchange of resources occurs that encourages specialization, division of 
labor, and an expansion i  total output. Intra-group marriages, club member- 
ships, study groups, and teacher-student interactions are examples of altruistic 
non-market social interactions. Altruistic market relations would include intra- 
group mentor and apprenticeship programs, work associations, and all work 
activities where productivity increases because of high levels of cooperation, 
trust, and reciprocity. 
Antagonistic social interactions are characterized byvarying amounts of dis- 
trust, non-cooperation, and exploitation. These are authoritarian social rela- 
tions. At least one person in the social interaction seeks to have full access to 
the other person's individual and group-based assets without allowing full 
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access to his or her own individual and group-based assets. In an antagonistic 
social interaction the exchange of resources is such that either one person's 
productivity increases while another's decreases or the productivity of both 
persons declines. Non-market examples of antagonistic social relations include 
such activities as interracial dating where at least one party has permanently 
precluded the possibility of a permanent relationship but has not announced 
this intention to the other party, purely instrumentalist participation in study 
groups, negative teacher-student i eractions, and limitations on social club 
membership. Similarly, market examples of antagonistic social interactions 
would include reneging on verbal promises made to other-group members, 
blocking the opportunities available to other-group ersons, or withholding 
productive information from other-group members. 
Within neutral social interactions no person contributes beyond a contractual 
obligation. Also, each person enters into social interactions without access to 
his or her own- or other-group resources; each must produce with only their 
individual skill and resources. Both non-market and market neutral social inter- 
actions are similar to altruistic social interactions, except hat the parties have 
fewer resources to utilize in the relationships. Neutral social interactions do not 
raise or lower productivity of each person. 
Within-Group Social Interactions 
If matching was only within groups, Africans with Africans and Europeans 
with Europeans, separate coordination games arise for both groups if there is 
a positive net benefit o racialist behavior. If both persons belong to the same 
group and employ a racialist norm, then their social interaction is altruistic. If 
both persons are individualistic, then their social interaction is neutral. If one 
person is a racialist but the other is an individualist, the racialist behaves altru- 
istically but the individualist behaves neutrally; the individualist is a "free- 
rider" who benefits without cost from the altruism of the racialist. 
Within-group social interactions yield a coordination game where a racialist 
norm is Pareto optimal (if there is a positive net benefit o altruism). This means 
that for within-group social interactions, both the racialist norm and the indi- 
vidualist norm leave the parties better off than they would be if one person is an 
individualist and the other is a racialist. However, only the altruistic exchange 
of resources associated with a racialist norm leads to a net increase in the pro- 
ductivity of both persons; thereby, creating a strong material incentive to 
engage in racialist behavior with respect o within-group exchanges. Thus, in 
this extreme case, depending on initial conditions, we might expect Europeans 
to adapt o either complete whiteness or complete individualism. Similarly, 
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we might expect Africans to self-identify completely as black or to be com- 
pletely individualists. 
Between-Group Social Interactions 
As a different extreme case, suppose matching was only between groups, 
Africans matching only with Europeans, and vice versa. In this case, the model 
becomes a prisoner's dilemma. Racialism is a dominate strategy for both 
Africans and Europeans, even though each group would be better off if its 
members could somehow agree to adhere to individualism. 
If the persons belong to different groups and both employ a racialist norm, 
then their social interaction is antagonistic. If both persons are individualistic, 
then their social interaction is neutral. If one person is a racialist but the other 
is an individualist, the racialist behaves antagonistically but the individualist 
behaves neutrally; the racialist uses his superior esources to extract uncom- 
pensated effort from the individualist. Because of wealth differences, the 
expected payoff to European racialist identity exceeds the expected payoff to 
African racialist identity. 
The antagonism of between-group social interactions yields a prisoners' 
dilemma where an individualist norm is Pareto optimal, yet the individualist 
norm is strictly dominated by the racialist norm. Productivity is highest for 
between-group social interactions based on an individualist norm; there is no 
alternative normative basis of social interaction between persons that could 
make anyone better off without making at least one person worse off. Between- 
group social interactions based on a racialist norm make each party worse off, 
that is, less productive, than they would be if individualism held sway in social 
relations. Individualist norms are difficult to maintain in between-group social 
interactions because the benefit (cost) of social dominance associated with 
racialist (individualist) behavior when the other person is an individualist 
(racialist) provides a strong material disincentive to act individualistically in
social interactions with persons who belong to the other group. As a result, each 
person's best interest given the behavior of the other person is to behave 
racially--leading to a racialist norm that will make everyone worse off than 
they would be with the individualist norm. 
As these extreme cases suggest, there are forces in the model that might 
push either group toward racialism or toward individualism, depending on 
matching assumptions, dynamic assumptions, parameter values, and initial 
conditions. The construction of racial identity is the result of both intra- and 
intergroup interaction. Persons pursuing aracialist strategy are altruistic toward 
own-group members but antagonistic toward other-group members. Persons 
pursing an individualist strategy are neither altruistic nor antagonistic toward 
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other persons. A social norm forms from the random interaction of persons, 
with each person staying with or changing to the strategy with above average 
fitness. Social fitness is measured by the impact of racial identity on wealth 
accumulation. 
Replicator Dynamics: Formation of Racial Norm 
We propose a simple process of norm formation. If a person earns a high pay- 
off in social interaction, his or her wealth increases. High productivity persons are 
imitated by less successful persons of their group; for example, a high produc- 
tivity European individualist is imitated by European racialists who then become 
European individualists. The fitness of each norm, that is, the income-creating 
capacity of a social norm, depends on both the fraction of own-group ersons 
who accept a racialist social norm and the fraction of other-group ersons who 
accept a racialist social norm. Mean group fitness is a weighted combination of 
the growth in income associated with individualist and racialist norms. 
As a racialized social norm is being established, a person's decision to 
accept or reject a racialized identity depends on the extent o which others 
accept or reject a racialized identity. The construction of identity by all others 
in society imposes both positive and negative xternalities on each person's 
identity actions. As such, the set of feasible racial identities that a person may 
assume is conditional on the person's characteristics, e.g., skin color, pheno- 
type, and sex, that may lead others to treat he person in a particular fashion or 
to impose an external set of behavioral expectations on the person. For exam- 
ple, a very dark complexion Latino with African or Indian phenotype may 
choose to acculturate into American society with a Protestant, English-only 
cultural identity, complete with "typical" modes of dress, etc., but current 
social norms do not allow such an individual to become "white." 
There are strong incentives for society to evolve into a racialized equilib- 
rium. Both the transition to this equilibrium and its stationary nature are char- 
acterized by highly unequal and persistent racial inequality in economic well- 
being. Furthermore, movements oand persistence of an individualized society 
cannot be established without regard to inter-group inequality in economic 
well-being. 
The relative expansion of the individualist and racialist norms throughout 
society depends on their relative ffects on personal well-being. If individual- 
ist behavior is expected to yield the highest payoff, each person in the group 
will have a strong incentive to imitate individualist behavior. Similarly, if  
racialist behavior yields the highest expected payoff, then each person in the 
group will have a strong incentive to imitate racialist behavior. Clearly, if all 
persons in a group have accepted a particular social norm, either individualist 
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or racialist, there are no incentives for the identity norm of that group to change 
over time. Pure populations reproduce pure populations; if there are no persons 
acting in accordance with a particular norm, then that identity will remain dor- 
mant during future periods. 
Result 1. lntragroup diversity. Society will display both individualist and 
racialist norms if and only if the expected productiveness of a racialist norm -- 
the expected productiveness of an individualist norm. 
Result 2. Intragroup olarization. In the absence of equality of rates of 
return, social identity will exhibit decreasing variation. If the racialist norm is 
spreading throughout society (and therefore the individualist norm is declin- 
ing), then the variation in identity among the group will move toward the com- 
pletely racialist norm as individualists gradually disappear f om the group. This 
is the very strongest of racial norms as the social group moves toward a com- 
pletely homogenous population of racialists. If the racialist norm is declining 
throughout society (and therefore the individualist norm is spreading), then 
we will ultimately observe a homogeneous population of individualists. 
Changes in the benefits and costs of racialism alter the relative prevalence of 
racialist and individualist identities within social groups and alter the distribu- 
tion of wealth between groups. But, the productiveness of a social interaction 
is also affected by the distribution of wealth. 
Result 3. In a racialized economy there is substantial segregation of all 
groups. As racialist behavior intensifies, there is increasing social bifurcation in 
individual interaction. 
Significance of Phenotype: Understanding Black and White 
To the extent hat a racialist social norm is resistant to mutations, a binary 
racial descriptor will arise so that all persons may readily establish the racial 
group membership ofall other persons. Racial classification permits access to the 
resources of family, friends, and those with a similar identity. Parents must decide 
whether they will socialize children to accept or reject he racial classification 
system, which affects the productivity of social interactions children will receive 
when they interact with members of their own and other demographic groups. 
When a racialist social norm exists, it is in the best interest of parents to raise 
their offspring to accept he binary descriptor. If the majority of other-group 
parents raise their children to accept he binary descriptor, then it is in the best 
interest of all own-group arents to raise their children to accept he binary 
descriptor. Further, the binary descriptor will be fashioned to limit entry into 
the wealthiest social group. 
Is it possible for a racialized economy to emerge from a society of equally 
wealthy groups? With equally wealthy social groups, the productivity of alter- 
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native social interactions i the same for both groups. Furthermore, society is 
initially fully integrated. Nevertheless, this economy will move toward racial 
polarization and inequality. This pattern is observed because the productivity 
effects of alternative social interactions till provide a strong incentive for 
racialism over individualism. The rising intensity of racial identification then 
leads to an increase in the extent of segregation. Own-group altruism combined 
with other-group antagonism permits racialism to be a more fit strategy than 
individualism (w R > wl). Hence, w R > w J is a necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion for a racialized economy to emerge when we start with a fully integrated 
economy with equal initial wealth. 
Consider now an exogenous reduction in interracial wealth inequality. The 
reparations movement has begun to enjoy considerable discussion in the popu- 
lar press. There are multiple reparations schemata but the common element 
involves some sort of wealth transfer from Americans of European descent o 
Americans of African descent. Our analysis suggests that reparations payment 
will not push the economy toward a non-racialized equilibrium. It is conceivable 
that if the reparations payment is sufficiently large it will equalize racial differ- 
ences in the productivities of social interactions. But, equal identity payoffs do 
not imply the end of racial identity construction and segregation. Indeed, the 
reparations payment will produce an increase in racialized identities. During the 
initial phases when wealth is being equalized, the percentage of Africans iden- 
tifying as black will increase and the percentage of Europeans identifying as 
white will decrease. After the period of wealth equalization the fraction of 
blacks will stabilize at a very high percentage (say, 90 percent of Africans), 
while the fraction of whites begins to rise rapidly among Europeans. Accord- 
ingly, reparations must be combined with other state actions to create equal 
opportunity if we wish to move the economy from a racialized equilibrium to a 
fully integrated society with an equal distribution of wealth across social groups. 
Arbitraging Racial Identity." One Way Passing and Asymmetric Tomming 
"Passing" is an individualistic attempt to arbitrage racial norms. Let us relax 
the assumption that skin shade easily distinguishes all Europeans from all 
Africans. Assume instead that there is a large (nontrivial) fraction of Africans 
who are physically indistinguishable from Europeans. Similarly, some non- 
trivial fraction of Europeans i  indistinguishable from Africans. 
Passing may be said to occur when European-featured Africans become 
white or when African-featured Europeans become black. Few Europeans pass 
as black. Anecdotal evidence suggests that when Europeans do pass and are 
found out they do not pay an economic or social penalty. On the other hand, 
Africans passing as white are a relatively more common phenomenon. But, 
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Africans who pass as white go to extreme lengths to make sure that they are never 
found out; there is a large wealth penalty for being exposed (Graham, 1999). 
Our model would explain passing as an individualistic attempt to arbitrage 
the norms of a racialized economy. If the mean wealth of Europeans exceeds 
the mean wealth of Africans by a substantial factor, there will be strong incen- 
tives for European-featured Africans to identify as white and relatively no 
incentive for African-featured Europeans to identify as black. In the former 
case there will be substantial penalties for exposure; namely, re-segregation 
into black society. 
Sollors (1996) reports on a number of studies that have attempted to mea- 
sure the extent of passing by blacks. Passing was most popular between the 
1850s and the 1940s. By one conservative estimate 2,600 blacks passed per year 
between 1920 and 1940. Alternatively, Sollors cites another study that estimates 
30,000 blacks passed per year between 1865 and 1946--representing more than 
2,000,000 people. If the latter estimate is correct, those who passed and their 
descendants numbered 5,000,000-8,000,000 people during the mid-1940s. 
"Tomming" may be defined as ideological passing for those who lack the 
appropriate physical features. Tomming then also represents an attempt to arbi- 
trage racial norms and thereby should enjoy a greater presence among the least 
wealthy social group. African Toms are not permitted to pass as white; rather, 
they are permitted at least partially to pass as individuals among whites if they 
are sufficiently ideologically integrated into whiteness. In this way, Toms are 
able to maintain black identity but behave in a cloying fashion toward whites. 
Such behavior satisfies white stereotypes in such a way that Toms are signaling 
that they are not dangerous to whites. 
DISCUSSION: UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN AMERICAN 
POL IT ICAL  ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY 
Orthodox economic analysis, that is, the black deficiency school, predicts 
that declines in the racial gap in education, income, and other aspects of well- 
being reduce black identity among African Americans. The stylized facts on 
black racial identity strong refute this prediction. Accordingly, we have pre- 
sented and discussed an alternative model where racial identity formation, seg- 
regation, and income inequality are endogenous outcomes. The construction of 
racial identity is the result of both intra- and intergroup interaction. Persons pur- 
suing a racialist strategy are altruistic toward own-group members but antago- 
nistic toward other-group members. Persons pursing an individualist strategy are 
neither altruistic nor antagonistic toward other persons. A social norm forms 
from the random interaction of persons, with each person staying with or chang- 
ing to the strategy with above average fitness. Social fitness is measured by the 
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impact of racial identity on wellbeing. Own-group altruism and other-group 
antagonism ay combine to produce strong incentives for racial polarization 
and segregation and persistent income inequality. Strong and persistent state 
action is required to dislodge an economy from a racialized equilibrium. 
By connecting the formation of racial identity with the distribution of well- 
being, this paper is able to explain the persistence of racial privilege in a mar- 
ket economy. The formation and persistence of a racialized economy simulta- 
neously segregates wealth, that is, one racial group has racial privilege in 
exercising control over both public and private resources while members of 
other groups do not have such power, and personal interactions. Hence, there is 
a relationship of domination and subordination underlying the dynamics we 
have presented in this paper. So, the intensity of racial identity, as well as the 
incentives for racial conflict, is very much related to the large inequities in 
material resources that are everywhere present in American society. 
America's increasingly complicated mix of distinctive phenotypic character- 
istics and unique cultural attributes will pose increasingly difficult challenges for 
public policy. However, the transformation f these attributes into economic prop- 
erty and competing racial identities is not a law of nature. This analysis uggests 
that an egalitarian i ter- and intraracial distribution of wealth must be a major 
element in any earnest attempt to purge American society of racism and racial con- 
flict. Achieving such a distributional outcome will become increasingly more dif- 
ficult the longer policy makers refuse to address the issue directly. 
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NOTES 
1. Each census respondent was l) free to report whatever racial category he/she wished 
to be a member of and 2) free to report membership n multiple racial categories. 36.4 
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million members of the United States' population reported that they were black or African 
American as of April 1, 2000. 
2. Akerloff's policy insights on crime, education, and affirmative action are interesting, 
even as they are unnecessarily Moynihanist. Assuming that greater severity and certainty 
of punishment reduce the short-term supply of criminal offenses, Akerloff writes that, in the 
long run, combating crime through deterrence is unlikely to work. Short term gain from 
reductions in crime because of greater severity and certainty of punishment may be 
outweighed by long term negative xternalities. "Prison itself is a school for counter cultural 
identity, and thus the breeding round for future crime." Crime prevention through drug 
treatment and rehabilitation programs and public jobs for inner city youth offers superior 
solutions to reducing crime. 
Greater public expenditure for schools in African American eighborhoods with high 
poverty rates will increase human capital formation. African American students need 
"extraordinary teacher and close personal attention to guide them through the issues 
concerning identity in addition to covering the standard curriculum." 
Affirmative action is a good policy because "it is a symbol of welcome for African 
Americans into the white society that has rejected them for so long." 
3. Ihtanfeldt and Scafidi explain that 
Segregation is apparently more of a voluntary phenomenon than is commonly 
believed. While we find that preferences for self-segregation matter to housing 
segregation, we have not identified the factors underlying these preferences. Blacks' 
preferences tolive among blacks may stem from a desire to share culture, prejudice 
against whites, lower housing prices in black neighborhoods, or blacks' perceptions 
of white hostility and discrimination against blacks. Whites' preferences for self- 
segregation may also be caused by a variety of factors, including prejudice against 
blacks, a belief that black neighbors may lower property values, or class prejudice 
combined with the use of race as a proxy for class. 
4. This figured is derived by the author from the University of Michigan's Panel Study 
on Income Dynamics. 
5. Stewart (1997) provides the initial attempt to formalize an economic analysis of racial 
identity, Using Becker's household production framework, Stewart (1997) developed a 
model whereby the intensity of racial-cultural identity of individual i of group j (RCIj) is a 
commodity that should be included in the individual's utility function. Stewart's formulation 
is novel in at least wo aspects. First, it represents he first paper to model racial identity 
explicitly as an endogenous variable. Second, his model of identity production i corporates 
the impact of own- and other-group racial identity production into the decision-making 
process of individual economic agents; hence, we can identify tractable hypotheses about 
the external effects of group identity production. 
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